Main Logo

Showing posts with label Russell. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Russell. Show all posts

Thursday, 25 June 2020

බද්‍යුද්දීන් හා සිවල් නිගමන

         

                                                   සිංහල ලිත් ඉලක්කම්

0  1   2    3    5  6  7  8  9






බද්‍යුද්දීන් හා සිවල් නිගමන

බදියුලා කීප දෙනෙක් ගැන ම දැන් පාස්කු ප්‍රහාරය සම්බන්ධයෙන් පත්කරලා තියෙන ජනාධිපති කොමිසමේ කියැවෙනවා. නැහැ එතැන අර ගණිතය ගැන විකාර කියවන ප්‍රංශ මහා දාර්ශනිකයකු කියන බදියු ගැන කිසිවක් කියැවෙන්නෙ නැහැ. මා ගණිතඥයකුවත් දාර්ශනිකයකුවත් ඉතිහාසඥයකුවත් භෞතික විද්‍යාඥයකුවත් නො වෙයි. මා ඒ විෂය ගැන උනන්දුවක් දක්වන්නකු පමණයි. ලෝකයේ ගණිතඥයන් යැයි කියන අයගෙන් බොහෝ දෙනකු බදියු ගණිතය ගැන කියන දේ සතපහකට මායිම් කරන්නේ නැහැ. ඒත් කිහිප දෙනකු බදියුගෙ විකාර කියවල තියෙනවා. ඔවුන් බදියුගෙ ගණිතය ගැන කියා ඇති දෙයින් තමයි මා ඒ ටික කිව්වෙ. 

Friday, 9 February 2018

බටහිර දැනුමේ අඩුපාඩු



බටහිර දැනුමේ අඩුපාඩු


බටහිර දැනුමෙ තියෙන තවත් වැදගත් ලක්‍ෂණයක් වන්නෙ වෙන් කිරීම. සමස්තය කැබලිවලට කඩා විශ්ලේෂණය කිරීම. එහි සංස්ලේෂණයට වඩා විශ්ලේෂණය වැදගත්. වෙන් කිරීම සමස්තයට වඩා වැදගත්. සමස්තය කතෝලික චින්තනයෙ අංගයක්. කතෝලික කියන එකේ තේරුමත් සමස්තය යන්න. මේ වෙන් කිරීම ප්‍රධාන තැනකට පත් කෙළේ මාටින් ලූතර්. ඔහු පාප් වහන්සේට විරුද්ධව කැරැල්ලක් ඇති කිරීමේ දීත් වෙන් කිරීම පෞද්ගලිකත්වය බලපෑවා. තම තමන්ට තනියම දෙවියන් වහන්සේ සමග එකතු වෙන්න පුළුවන් බව මාටින් ලූතර්ගෙ අදහස වුණා.

Saturday, 29 September 2012

Reason, Experience and Prathyaksha - nonpublished

Prof. Carlo Fonseka in his parting article claims that I do not understand multiple meanings of the word reason. “In his response to my claim, Prof. Nalin says:’What Prof. Fonseka tries to say is that evidence of senses of human beings is the deciding factor and not the soundness of human reasoning. However, he himself ends that paragraph with "therefore there is reason to accept the truth of the theory of relativity". (The Island, Sept 8) Thus Prof. Nalin is asserting that by using the word ‘reason’ in the preceding sentence, I am being inconsistent about my claim concerning the primacy of sensory experience as the test of truth. Anyone who knows the multiple meanings of the word ‘reason’ will grant that the word ‘reason’ in the phrase "therefore there is reason to accept the truth of the theory of relativity" refers to the evidence of the senses, and not to the exercise of pure reason.” However, this is what I had said in my article of 8th September. “What Prof. Fonseka tries to say is that evidence of senses of human beings is the deciding factor and not the soundness of human reasoning. However, he himself ends that particular paragraph with ‘therefore there is reason to accept the truth of the theory of relativity’. In any event the Theory of General Relativity has failed to explain what is called dark energy and some other phenomena I have mentioned in my previous articles. Further Prof. Fonseka could not resist the temptation to quote Russell: ‘Before tackling Einstein’s law, it is as well to convince ourselves, on logical grounds, that Newton’s law of gravitation cannot be quite right.’ Russell mentions two things here. Firstly that Newton’s Law of Gravitation cannot be quite right. Thus if somebody says that Einstein incorporated Newton’s gravitation theory then the latter has incorporated a theory that is not quite right. Secondly Russell talks of convincing of oneself that Newton’s theory cannot be quite right on logical grounds. Thus Prof. Fonseka is not consistent in his statements and supporting statements.” Prof. Fonseka conveniently ignores Russell’s remark on convincing oneself on logical grounds that Newton’s gravitation cannot be quite right, which he himself had quoted. Prof. Fonseka while ignoring Russell on convincing oneself that Newton’s gravitation cannot be quite right on logical grounds and not on so called empirical grounds had said that there was reason to accept the truth of theory of relativity.

The so called empirical evidence is nothing but a reason for Prof. Fonseka to accept the so called truth of relativity. It is not pure reason for the simple reason that there is nothing called pure reason in a Kantian sense or otherwise. Similarly there are no pure empirical grounds on which one comes to conclusions. All deductions starting from “if A=B and B=C, then A=C” are inductions and in that sense all so called reasoning is based on induction that cannot be called rational. Western Philosopher Hume did not believe causality purely on empirical evidence and in western philosophy problems of this sort cannot be solved. There are no sense perceptions without conceptions and Prof. Fonseka, how much he tries, cannot show that he believes in the theory of relativity because of evidence of pure sense experience. Firstly there is no pure sense experience as all perceptions are conception laden just as much so called facts are theory laden, and secondly causality in western thinking is based on induction. People believe in sense experience due to repeats and induction. Induction which has no rational basis as such ironically plays a big role in reasoning. It is hilarious to see so called empiricists rejecting sense experience on the grounds that appearance cannot be true and then testing deductions of theories that people have constructed, using their senses based on nothing but appearances. I have explained some of these in my latest book “Batahira Vidyava, Arsenic saha Deviyo” and Prof. Fonseka could gain something at least in his old age by reading the book.

Prof. Fonseka says “Prof. Nalin has unequivocally declared that by virtue of the culture into which he was born, his approach to life and the world is that of a Sinhala, Theravada Buddhist. In other words his credo is the religion of his birth”. I have never said anything equivalent of what Prof. Fonseka ascribes to me. This could have been the case if I had had my religion of my parents as my Philosophy from childhood, though religion is different from philosophy and culture. However, I had been a Marxist, Scientist though people may claim that I failed to grasp the relevant disciplines, before I became a Theravada Buddhist for the second time having gone through an education in western science and Marxism. There are many ways to create knowledge other than through rationalism and empiricism and I subscribe to “Prathyaksha”, which is not sense perception as such. However I know that I am spiritually not advanced, and as said in the second part of Kalama Sutta which Prof. Fonseka ignored for many decades I believe in the “Prathyaksha” of my Vinnus. However, though not approved by Theravada Buddhism I also construct knowledge (theories, concepts etc.,), until I am advanced spiritually through “Bhavana”, based on the Sinhala Buddhist Chinthanaya relative to Sinhala Buddhist culture. It was theorizing that way we were able to convince many people in this country that the LTTE could be defeated with a non wavering political leadership. Incidentally we constructed our basic theory that knowledge (not merely western science) is created relative a culture based on a Chinthanaya though some who have been trained in western science try their best to ascribe it to some westerners. All theories whether they are constructed based in the Sinhala Buddhist Chinthanaya or Greek Judaic Christian Chinthanaya are mere stories which appear to be consistent with other theories “facts” etc.
(12/09/27)

Copyright Prof. Nalin De Silva

Sunday, 9 October 2011

On so called scientific knowledge – V

Marxists who consider themselves to be scientists in spite of Popper who said that Marxism is not a science as it cannot be falsified, are very fond of quoting Marx who had said that "all science would be superfluous if the outward appearance and the essence of things directly coincided." The outward appearance is “grasped” through the five sense organs, with of course the mind playing a significant role though the scientists often emphasise the importance of the five senses, and what this statement means is that what is grasped through the five sense organs is not the essence. Many if not all empiricists would begin with the assumption that there is an external world for us to grasp and acquiring knowledge begins with sense experience. However, they would not concede that perceptions of the outside world cannot be experienced without conceptions. The empiricists would assume with Russell that there is something called “bluishness” that exists independent of any observers. However, this is a hollow statement like that on existence of the Newtonian absolute space. Newton may not have formulated the term absolute space but he had some notion of it.

The absolute space in a Newtonian sense is a space devoid of any matter or radiation and that includes observers. Thus there is nothing in a Newtonian absolute space and without observers how would one know that there is an absolute space, through direct experience? The absolute space very often considered to be the first inertial frame of reference (the other inertial frames of reference are considered to be moving with uniform velocities with respect to one another as well as with respect to the absolute space) in which Newton’s laws of motion are valid cannot be observed. The moment an observer “enters” the absolute space, it ceases to be an absolute space as there is matter (and of course mind whether one minds it or not) and Newton has given a concept that cannot be observed. Absolute space and inertial frames of reference are only abstract concepts and all that can be said is that an inertial frame of reference is a frame of reference in which Newton’s Laws are valid! This is in contrast to the usual instructions given at schools and universities where it is said that Newton’s Laws are valid only in inertial frames of reference.

There cannot be any bluishness without an observer with a mind who has constructed the concept of bluishness. There is no perception without conception and those who try to separate perception from conception and assume that there is perception without conception will come across many difficulties. Can there be a perception of bluishness without the concept of bluishness? If there is an external world independent of the observers then could anybody establish this “fact” without resorting to the concept of an external world? The external world itself is a conception and nothing “exists” independent of the conceptions created by the human beings and others with minds. It should be pointed out that concepts do not have to be expressed in terms of words and children and non human animals who cannot speak have concepts expressed in mental pictures.

Now let us go back to Marx. According to him there is the sensory perceptible world but that is not the essence. The essence cannot be grasped through the five sense organs and one has to contemplate with abstract concepts in grasping the essence of “things”. Now how are we to know that what we have grasped with abstract concepts is the essence of “things”. There is only one way according to empiricists and that is to compare deductions of the abstract concepts or “science” with the empirical world which is only an outward appearance! Newton formulated the theory of gravitation which was assumed to be the essence of “things” at least as far as falling of coconuts and apples, and which could not be felt with our sense organs in spite of a Cambridge education. Gravitation can be “felt” only with the mind without any sensory perceptions in the western sense and the essence of gravity had to be checked with comparing its deductions with sensory perceptible appearances such as the motion of the planets around the sun and advance of the perihelion (the perihelion also moves without itself remaining static) of Mercury. Now the question is whether advance of the perihelion is only an outward appearance. According to Marxian science, one assumes that what one observes is only an outward appearance, then goes “deep” into formulate a “theory” to understand the essence of things and comes back to outward appearances to check the theory or the essence of the “things”. The scientists “including Marxists” are very fond of telling the world that the results of experiments based on deductions from theories have to be checked with the “outside world” without realising that outward appearances become the ultimate judge in their scheme, which they had first rejected as non science being just outward appearances. How does one formulate science without appealing to so called non science?

This is a contradiction very often ignored by the western scientists. The so called outward appearances are not science and the essence or the science is expressed in theories and concepts which may or may not be abstract but the “science” has to be tested in order to know that it is the “essence” or truth or whatever, using the so called outward appearances. There could be very few concrete theories as any general theory has to be abstract and abstract theories can be grasped only with the mind without appealing to observations using the (five) sense organs. Unless somebody comes out with a way of checking abstract theories without appealing to observations western science cannot get rid of this contradiction. Bhavana and Yogic exercises may be one way of testing as well as formulating abstract theories and we should not scorn these methods as means of “acquiring” or creating knowledge.

As an example of the process of abstract thinking consider the generalisation from mangoes to objects. A mango is a very concrete concept and mangos can be observed. A mango can be seen, touched, tasted and sniffed if one wants to. Now consider the concept of a fruit, which is an abstract concept though many people would not realize it. One cannot see, touch, taste or smell a fruit in general, as there is no fruit as such that “exists” in a concrete form. A fruit can be a mango, an apple, a banana, ( amba, damba, narang, kesel or any such thing) and one cannot visualize a fruit as such. A fruit is an abstract concept but an abstract concept that many people can grasp. It has to be mentioned that a fruit cannot be visualised, and it is only a mental concept that we have formed by abstracting or generalizing amba, damba, narang, kesel etc. Now humans who are capable of abstracting have not stopped at the concept of a fruit. They have come out with the more abstract concept of an object. An object could not only be a fruit, but a flower, a table, a chair etc. Is there anybody who could visualize an object? In Applied Mathematics and Theoretical Physics we throw objects out of windows or project them without even thinking whether it is a mango or a coconut. When Galileo or his friend dropped two iron balls or whatever, from the leaning tower of Pisa two objects were dropped and not mere balls.

Galileo’s observation was a generalized observation in the sense that whether one drops balls, coconuts or apples they come down with the same acceleration, near the surface of the earth. It was true even for feathers provided they were dropped in a vacuum. Of course Galileo did not create a vacuum in Pisa but left to the imagination of those present to create a vacuum in their minds. Thus Galileo’s experiment though considered to be very simple and concrete involving balls and towers, it was not so. From balls and towers he generalized and declared in an abstract way that OBJECTS (no balls) dropped from a HEIGHT (no towers) ANYWHERE (not Pisa) close to the surface of the earth would fall with the same acceleration.

Copyright Prof. Nalin De Silva